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1 Introduction
It is now a decade since the 1997 economic crisis hit
Indonesia. Sparked off in neighbouring Thailand, the
crisis was so deep and widespread that it was not
until 2004 that the Indonesian economy was able to
achieve a fully fledged recovery. Moreover, the
economic reforms implemented under the IMF
programme from October 1997 to 2003 made
recovery efforts take longer than in other countries
affected by the crisis. However, thanks to sound
macroeconomic policies, financial sector
restructuring and structural reforms, economic
recovery eventually came to fruition. The
deterioration of the social, economic and political
environment – a consequence of the crisis – has also
gradually been reversed. The economic crisis induced
fundamental changes in the Indonesian economy, in
the financial and non-financial sectors alike. In 2003,
the country was able to graduate from the IMF
programme. Supported by a strong foreign exchange
reserves position, the Indonesian economy was able
to bring forward the debt repayments owed to the
IMF; and by October 2006, the country was able to
repay the remaining debt of US$3.75 billion.
The economic reforms implemented to propel the
economy out of crisis have in general been successful
in creating macroeconomic stability. Fundamental
changes have also been seen in the area of
institutional and economic management, where a
strong foundation for better economic development
in the future has been laid. That said, it is not always
the case that major reforms necessarily guarantee
continued macroeconomic stability and sustainable
economic growth. The Indonesian economy
continues to be very vulnerable, and there is no
better proof of this than the ‘mini crisis’ in the
foreign exchange market, which hit the country in
2005, just a year after the recovery from the 1997
crisis had been fully achieved.
This article examines the Indonesian experience in
dealing with the crisis. It describes the country’s
recovery from it and reforms undertaken, and
identifies remaining sources of vulnerability facing
the economy. It is organised into six sections.
Following this introduction, Section 2 analyses the
process of economic recovery and Section 3 the
financial market developments. Section 4 analyses
trends in capital flows and the level of international
reserves. Section 5 discusses the remaining sources
of vulnerability, and highlights the 2005 ‘mini crisis’
as a warning call to the degree of vulnerability facing
Indonesia at present. Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic recovery
The economic crisis reached its peak in 1998 when
the Indonesian economy experienced a severe
13.13 per cent GDP contraction. The year 1999
marked the start of the economic recovery phase.
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Figure 1 GDP growth (%)
Note until September 2006.
Source Central Bank of Indonesia.
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The country’s economic growth (Figure 1) has been
around 5.5 per cent over the past few years.
In the recovery phase, a shift in the main drivers of
the economy was observed, with domestic
consumption replacing investment and exports as
the main driver. At the sectoral level, industry,
electricity and construction are no longer the main
engines of growth; the engines are now limited to
the transportation and electricity sectors. Some
report signs of de-industrialisation in the country.
The economy continues to be bedevilled by structural
obstacles such as an unfavourable investment climate,
low competitiveness and limited high-quality human
resources. Moreover, the above factors are
compounded by hurdles which the government faces
in policy implemention in Indonesia. Thus, it is not
surprising that the performance of the economy has
been rather modest, when compared with that of
the pre-crisis period.
2.1 Economic growth
Investment, consumption and exports were the main
drivers of economic growth prior to the economic
crisis. However, real economic growth plummeted
from 7.8 per cent in 1996 to minus 13 per cent in
1998. Consumption, investment and imports
contracted (Figure 2). The only exception to the
downward trend was the export sector (including
both goods and services), which showed positive
growth in 1998.
The economic crisis undermined growth in all sectors
of the economy (Figures 3a,b), with the exception of
agriculture, electricity, gas and clean water.
Construction, trade, hotels and restaurants and the
financial sector fared worst. The process of economic
recovery started in 1999, when growth in consumption
expenditure gradually moved into positive territory. The
turnaround became more evident in 2000, when all
sectors registered positive growth with the processing
sector coming out as the best performer, followed by
the trade and transportation sectors.
There are some signs that Indonesia experienced a
de-industrialisation process. Such signs include the
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Figure 2 GDP growth by expenditure (%)
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Figure 3a GDP growth by sector (%)
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Figure 3b GDP growth by sector (%)
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tendency for the contribution of the processing
industry to cause GDP growth to fall over the post-
crisis period, despite strong recovery from 2000 as
just highlighted; another factor was the reduction in
employment generated by the industry. Two factors
responsible for the decline in the contribution of the
processing industry to GDP growth are the closure
of some companies and the relocation of others to
foreign countries. The aforementioned problems are,
by and large, attributable to the government failure
to resolve a number of outstanding issues in the
country, that range from labour related issues, the
multitude of regulations stifling business operations,
tax bureaucracy, especially the lack of transparency in
executing tax returns, and rampant smuggling.
2.2 International trade
After a decline in 1998–9, exports in 2000 showed
signs of recovery. This was due mainly to an increase
in non-oil exports as well as higher oil export
revenues arising from high international oil prices. An
upward trend in both exports and imports can be
observed over 2000–5.
Textiles, textile products and electricity goods
constitute important sources of non-oil exports for
Indonesia. Plywood, palm oil, coal, rubber products,
copper ores, chemical products, paper, iron/steel
products and shrimps also have a significant role.
Despite the positive performance of exports in the
aftermath of the crisis, a number of factors threaten
its sustainability: growing competition with China
and Vietnam, persistence of non-tariff policies in
importing countries, and the high deposit margin
demanded by foreign banks within the L/C (letter of
credit) scheme. Meanwhile, strictly domestic related
factors include: increase in production cost due to
increases in fuel prices, electricity charges, illegal
levies, unfavourable workers’ regulations which
reduce competitiveness, poor law enforcement and
security, and higher interest rates on credit in
Indonesia than other regional competitors.
In turn, the trade balance (Figure 4) showed a large
surplus after the crisis, which was more than enough
to compensate for the deficit in service transactions,
thereby contributing to a current account surplus.
However, since 2001, the size of the current account
surplus has been showing a downward trend due to
the larger service deficit growth than the trade
balance surplus, although a reversal in the trend
started to be observed in 2006.
The rising deficit in the services account in the
aftermath of the crisis was caused by the high cost
of debt servicing by the government, an increase in
transportation transactions, and the oil and gas
sector deficit.
2.3 Investment
Prior to the crisis, Indonesia registered high gross
fixed capital formation growth (Figure 5) hovering at
about 14 per cent per annum. However, the onset of
the crisis had a massive impact on gross capital
formation, sending its evolution into negative
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Figure 4 Indonesia's trade balance
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Figure 5 Growth of investment (%)
Note until September 2006.
Source Central Bank of Indonesia.
8,57
-33,01
-18,20
16,74
7,70
1,36
15,71
9,93
14,51
14,00
0,80
-0,20
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
*
territory during the 1998–9 period, followed by a
turnaround which meant positive growth, more
recently. Even then, the growth achieved so far is still
below the levels achieved prior to the crisis; a
common pattern across the crisis-affected countries
(ADB 2007).
Net foreign direct investment (FDI; Figure 6) flows
into Indonesia decreased drastically during the crisis,
culminating in net negative flows as foreign
investment outflows outweighed inflows. The FDI
deficit reached a maximum of US$7.1 billion in 2002.
However, in 2004, FDI flows registered a surplus of
US$1.8 billion, which increased to US$6.1 billion in
2005. The higher FDI level in 2005 is due to foreign
acquisition of the HM Sampoerna tobacco company
by a US-based company. The FDI surplus for the first
half of 2006 reached US$975 million.
The investment climate is not yet conducive enough
to attract substantial foreign and domestic capital
into the Indonesian economy.
Indonesia has earned a very low rank in a survey
conducted by the International Finance Corporation
(IFC 2005 and 2006) on Doing Business in Indonesia
(Table 1) – ranked 135th in 2006, lower than the 131st
rank earned in 2005. According to the IFC, Indonesia
continues to experience serious problems that range
from starting a business, processing operational
permits/licences, labour issues, registering property
ownership, paying taxes, implementing contracts and
in closing businesses.
In a bid to promote economic growth, especially by
increasing investment and production, the
government issued three policy packages on
infrastructure and investment in February 2006, and
on the financial sector in July 2006.
The key component of the infrastructure policy package
is the establishment of a Public Private Partnership (PPP)
Centre, which is charged with the task of formulating
the working model for government–private collaboration
on infrastructure as well as the establishment of a
financing agency responsible for financing infrastructure
projects outside of the government. The investment
package was issued with the goal of improving
investment service delivery; customs and excise
programmes; and tax incentives for investment. It has
also included the revision of the value added tax for the
promotion of exports; labour issues and the creation of a
flexible and productive labour market; and policies on the
empowerment of SMEs (Small-and Medium-sized
Enterprises) and cooperatives. Sluggish performance of
investment in Indonesia makes the package vital.
Meanwhile, the goal underlying the financial sector
package has been the need to enhance the
performance and efficiency of the financial sector
which is seen as necessary for improving the
investment climate. The financial sector policy
package covers such areas as financial system stability,
bank financial institutions, non-bank financial
institutions and the capital market.
Nonetheless, the spate of policy packages so far
issued by the government have not yet yielded
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Figure 6 FDI in Indonesia
Note until September 2006.
Source Central Bank of Indonesia.
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Figure 7 Poverty and unemployment (%)
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significant results due to slow implementation of the
policies and a host of other obstacles.
2.4 Unemployment and poverty
One of the adverse effects of the economic crisis
was the rise in unemployment and poverty levels.
Although Indonesia has made significant progress in
economic recovery and growth, the unemployment
rate remains high. According to the Central Bureau
of Statistics (CBS) data, the rate of unemployment
shows an upward trend (Figure 7). It was at 11.2 per
cent in 2005, higher than the 8.1 per cent registered
in 2001. The most recent CBS survey puts the rate of
unemployment at 10.28 per cent in 2006.
The economic crisis sparked off a sharp increase in
the number of people registered as poor. To mitigate
the impact the crisis had on people’s living standards
and on poverty, the government implemented
emergency social security net programmes in 1998.
Poverty incidence reached its peak in 1999, when
23.4 per cent of the population was categorised as
poor. However, unlike the rate of unemployment,
which continues to rise, poverty levels show a
downward trend. Poverty incidence was 15.9 per
cent in 2005. Nonetheless, the poverty level rose
again to 17.7 per cent (CBS Survey of March 2006),
partly as a result of the fuel price hikes observed in
October 2005 (Figure 7).
Recent developments of the fiscal and foreign trade
indicators
The economic recovery programme has drained the
country’s budget, pushing the budget deficit to
unprecedented levels. In light of that, the Indonesian
government embarked on fiscal consolidation measures
which were aimed at reducing government debt and
the budget deficit. Signs of success of fiscal
consolidation measures began to emerge in 2001, with
the fall in the debt as a proportion of GDP and the
budget deficit decrease (Figure 8).
The rise in international oil prices in 2005 has put
fiscal pressure on the national budget due to an
increase in fuel subsidies. The policy adopted by the
government in October 2005 to increase fuel prices
has helped to reduce the effect of oil subsidies on
the budget. As compensation for cuts in fuel
subsidies, the government introduced the direct
cash transfer programme for the poor. To finance
this and other social sector programmes, it helps
that tax revenues are rising over time as a result of
intensification and widening of the tax base,
supervision, and improvements in tax regulations.
That said, Indonesian tax to GDP ratio remains at a
mere 13 per cent, which is low even when
compared with countries at a similar stage of
development.
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Table 1 Doing business in Indonesia (comparing 175 economies)
Ease of … 2005 rank 2006 rank Change in rank
Doing business 131 135 –4
Starting a business 161 161 0
Dealing with licences 129 131 –2
Employing workers 141 140 +1
Registering property 118 120 –2
Getting credit 76 83 –7
Protecting investors 58 60 –2
Paying taxes 129 133 –4
Trading across borders 55 60 –5
Enforcing contracts 144 145 –1
Closing a business 126 136 –10
Source IFC.
In the wake of the economic crisis, Indonesia established
a stable deficit policy up to the present day. The deficit
shows a downward trend since 2003, which is
attributed to government endeavours to maintain fiscal
sustainability and improvement in budget management.
By 2006, the percentage of government debt to GDP
had reached below 50 per cent. However, Indonesia
being a relatively small open economy and characterised
by vulnerable fundamentals, the ratio is still too high. The
level of debt that is safe for Indonesia is believed to be
around 30 per cent of GDP.
Financing the budget deficit comes from the
domestic economy, especially banking and revenues
generated by bond issues. Borrowing from abroad,
especially project loans, is another source of
financing the budget deficit. The Government Debt
in 2005 had reached US$134,774 million, 51 per cent
of which constitutes domestic debt and 49 per cent
foreign debt (Table 2). In general, both the domestic
and foreign debt are showing a downward trend,
which will reduce the impact on the budget.
3 Financial market development
Banking reforms have involved improvement in the
banking industry as well as supporting the development
of Indonesian financial markets. The development of the
non-bank financial institutions in Indonesia has been
very rapid (Table 3), with their share of GDP increasing
over time. Although the banking industry remains the
dominant part of the system, and its asset values have
increased over time, its share of GDP has declined,
from 75 per cent in 2000 to 53.8 per cent in 2005.
3.1 Banking sector
The banking sector has experienced very rapid
growth in Indonesia, especially since the financial
deregulation package issued in 1983. As the primary
financial institution in the financial market, the state
of banks bear strongly on the Indonesian economy,
which is why the 1997 banking crisis had so many
dire consequences for the economy.
The problems facing the banking sector were
aggravated by poor management during the initial
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Figure 8 State budget deficit/surplus
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Table 2 The position of government debt by duration
Dalam Juta* (US$) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
External debt 60,796 58,814 69,789 68,939 69,471 66,066
Total of GDP (%) 46.7 48.2 48.7 47.3 49.7 49.0
Short-term – – – – – –
Long-term 60,796 58,814 69,789 68,939 69,471 66,066
Domestic debt 69,288 63,157 73,642 76,799 70,281 68,678
Total of GDP (%) 53.3 51.8 51.3 52.7 50.3 51.0
Short-term 1,358 2,018 3,029 4,100 2,412 –
Long-term 67,930 61,139 70,613 72,699 67,869 68,678
Total 130,084 121,971 143,431 145,738 139,752 134,744
* in million
Source Ministry of Finance, calculated.
stages of the crisis, which undermined public
confidence. Falling public confidence compounded
bank woes by inducing bank panics. Moreover, the
steep depreciation of the Rupiah compelled the
monetary authority to raise interest rates as high as
70 per cent (Bank Indonesia Certificate). Non-
performing loans (NPLs) rose to about 60–70 per
cent. The rise in NPLs, the banking structural and
economic problems, and the unfavourable social and
political situation which affected bank operations,
drove the Indonesian banking industry into crisis. The
banking crisis caused a steep decrease in financial
intermediation as well as in other banking services.
Thus, bank restructuring had to be undertaken in
order to restore the soundness in the banking
industry.
With regard to bank restructuring, the government
undertook the re-capitalisation of banks then facing
financial hardships, a process which led to large scale
nationalisation of the banking industry. The immense
financial resources spent in the re-capitalisation
process reached Rp658.7 trillion (around 55 per cent
of GDP), and had serious repercussions to the
national budget. In addition, with the objective of
restoring public confidence in banking institutions,
the government implemented the full blanket
guarantee policy on all bank obligations. Such a
policy induced a shift in the public’s preference from
investing in alternative assets, to saving their money
in banks, where it earned certain returns at lower
risk. However, the full blanket guarantee policy has
now been rescinded, in line with the establishment
of the deposit insurance agency, which offers limited
guarantee.
Key indicators underlying the health of the banking
industry have shown remarkable improvement. Figure
9 shows the decrease in NPLs and an increase in
capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Bank intermediation is
back on track and is improving; a fact shown by the
rise in the loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR). Credit
expansion has pushed the LDR ratio to 66.2 per cent
in 2005, far higher than the 33.0 per cent registered
in 2001. Nonetheless, the recent macroeconomic
instability has somewhat reversed the upward trend in
LDR, as it fell to 65.3 per cent in September 2006 and
also sparked an increase in net NPLs from 1 to 3 per
cent during the 2002–4 period, to 5 per cent in 2005.
As regards credit disbursement by purpose/use,
consumer credit registered the highest growth:
38 per cent in 2004 and 37 per cent in 2005.
Meanwhile, investment credit grew at a lower rate,
by 25.7 per cent in 2004 and 13.2 per cent in 2005.
A similar trend is observed regarding working capital
credit. This latter type of credit constituted the
largest percentage of credit disbursed by the
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Table 3 Assets of Indonesian financial institutions, 2000–5 (trillion Rp)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
% % % % % % 
Value GDP Value GDP Value GDP Value GDP Value GDP Value GDP
Banks
Commercial banks 1,039.9 74.8 1,099.7 65.3 1,112.2 59.7 1,213.5 59.1 1,272.1 56.0 1,469.8 53.8
Rural credit banks 4.7 0.3 6.5 0.4 9.1 0.5 12.6 0.6 14.4 0.6 16.8 0.6
Insurance 52.4 3.8 64.9 3.9 70.4 3.8 88.3 4.3 105.8 4.7 75.1 2.8
Pension fund 30.0 2.2 34.9 2.1 41.2 2.2 49.5 2.4 107.1 4.7 – –
Pawn services 1.4 0.1 1.8 0.1 2.4 0.1 2.7 0.1 3.5 0.2 4.8 0.2
Finance company 35.8 2.6 37.3 2.2 39.9 2.1 47.2 2.3 74.9 3.3 95.2 3.5
Capital market
Shares issued 225.8 16.2 231.3 13.7 241.3 13.0 251.3 12.2 257.8 11.3 267.2 9.8
Bonds issued 28.8 2.1 31.7 1.9 37.8 2.0 63.8 3.1 83.0 3.7 91.1 3.3
Source Bank Indonesia Annual Report, Ministry of Finance, CBS, World Bank.
Indonesian banking industry in 2005, registering
more than 50 per cent of total credit, which is
mainly channelled to existing debtors (Table 4).
The next phase of the banking reforms will be in four
major areas, which will encompass sustaining the
consolidation process, strengthening banking
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Figure 9 Indonesian banking sector performance (%)
Table 4 Developments in Indonesian bank credit, 2001–6
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006*
Position (trillion Rp)
Working capital 181.6 206.6 231.2 289.6 354.5 382.7
Investment 75.8 84.4 94.5 118.7 134.4 140.5
Consumption 58.6 80.0 109.4 151.1 206.7 217.9
Total credit 316.0 371.0 435.1 559.4 695.6 741.1
Growth (%)
Working capital 5.6 13.8 11.9 25.2 22.4 12.2
Investment 10.5 11.3 11.9 25.7 13.2 5.4
Consumption 39.0 36.5 36.8 38.1 36.8 9.6
Total credit 11.7 17.4 17.3 28.6 24.4 10.1
Share (%)
Working capital 57.5 55.7 53.1 51.8 51.0 51.6
Investment 24.0 22.7 21.7 21.2 19.3 19.0
Consumption 18.5 21.6 25.1 27.0 29.7 29.4
Total credit 100 100 100 100 100 100
*September 2006
Source Central Bank of Indonesia, calculated.
infrastructure, bolstering prudential adherence in
banking and the promotion of financial
intermediation. Consolidation efforts will be carried
out by strengthening bank capital through a shift in
strategy from a market-driven to a light-handed
approach.
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 4  July 2007 53
trading volume, 
302.4
419.8430.5
241.1
174.5171.3140.7185.5
91.881.6
trading value,
950.9
413.9
255.2
253.7
165.9117.1132.4161.1
102.8132.2
CSPI, 
1534.62
1162.63
1000.23
679.30
424.94392.03
416.32
676.92
398.03
401.71
0
600
1200
1800
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006*
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Table 5 Foreign participation in the Indonesian financial market
Ownership on Domestic Government Bonds (trillion Rp) Total foreign trading (%)
2000 – –
2001 – 10.80
2002 1.04 8.00
2003 6.06 28.10
2004 10.74 41.00
2005 31.09 40.06
2006* 53.97 –
*October.
Source JSX & Ministry of Finance.
Meanwhile, strengthening the banking infrastructure
will entail the formation of the deposit insurance
agency (Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation),
human resource development in the banking sector
and regulations on complaints mechanisms. Bolstering
prudential banking will be done in accordance with
the policy of adherence to the Basel Core Principles.
In transforming the banking industry, Bank Indonesia
launched the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API)
framework on 10 January 2004. The API framework,
which is based on the vision of creating a sound,
strong and efficient banking system that will ensure
stability in the financial system, will provide the
guiding principles for the development of the
banking industry in the next 5–10 years. The vision is
projected to come to fruition through the
implementation of six interdependent steps:
(1) healthy banking structure, (2) effective regulatory
system, (3) independent and effective supervision,
(4) strong banking system, (5) sufficient infrastructure
support and (6) consumer protection.
Banking reforms have succeeded in improving the
banking performance, but progress in certain areas is
still slow, especially concerning credit expansion to
the productive sectors.
3.2 Capital market
Economic recovery has stimulated capital market
recovery. The number of new share issuers in the
capital market, both initial public offering (IPO) and
right issue in the capital bonds markets (especially
government bonds), is rising. Figure 10 shows the
capital market composite index which has risen rapidly
from 2002 to 2006, and which made it one of the
best performers in Asia and in the world. The
development of the Jakarta Composite Index was the
third best performer in the world in 2005, and the
fifth best performer in 2006. Such a development
points to good prospects for the emergence of a
capital market that could become one of the main
sources of financing in the economy. However,
prudence needs to be exercised so that a possible
bubble in the stock market does not become
problematic.
Some of the factors that explain the buoyant
performance of the stock exchange have been the
improvement in investor confidence in line with
marked progress in macroeconomic conditions in
Indonesia, upgrading Indonesian government
sovereign long-term debt denominated in Rupiah and
foreign currency, and Indonesia’s graduation from
countries black listed for not cooperating in dealing
with money-laundering related crimes. Besides, the
inclusion of some blue chip shares in the ASEAN
index, based on the composition of large market
capitalisation value, high liquid transactions and
significant public ownership criteria, provided positive
sentiments that boosted capital market activities, and
served as incentives that attracted foreign investors.
Foreign participation is increasing in the capital
market (Table 5), which can be construed from the
increase in portfolio investment since 2002.
However, the high short-term capital inflow into the
capital market has the potential danger to increase
vulnerability. The country should observe it with
caution because short-term capital can easily exit the
economy, sparking off financial market instability.
Derivative transactions in Indonesia, which are
carried out by Surabaya Stock Exchange Bursa Efek
Surabaya (BES) have very little value; Rp1.3 trillion in
2004 or 2005. The market has not developed to any
real extent in Indonesia, making its existence
insignificant in the financial market.
4 Capital flows and reserves
4.1 Capital flows
In 1998, large private capital outflows resulted in a
large deficit in the capital account of the balance of
payments (see Figure 11).
From 2002 onwards, the capital and financial
account deficit started to decrease as a result of
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Figure 11 Capital account in Indonesia
Source Indonesian Financial Statistics, Bank Indonesia.
increasing private capital inflows, mainly in the form
of portfolio flows and later FDI, and a decrease in
private sector debt servicing commitments, especially
in the banking sector.
From 2002 to date, private capital flows to Indonesia
are thus mainly in the form of short-term portfolio
investment. FDI was negative until 2004, due to the
persistent unfavourable investment climate, and
strong competition in the Asian region, especially
from China.
Private capital flows registered an increase in surplus
from US$4.4 billion in 2004 to US$5.1 billion in
2005. The increase arose from a surge in net
portfolio investment and net FDI inflow in 2005.
However, in the second-quarter of 2005, a net
outflow of foreign investor funds took place sending
the account into deficit in that quarter. The large
capital outflow was caused by factors such as the fall
in public confidence in the Rupiah and the impact of
the fuel price hikes on the sustainability of the fiscal
policy. The increase in portfolio investment from
2002 to date must be observed with caution, as it
shows high sensitivity to changes in macroeconomic
and international conditions.
4.2 Reserve level
The level of reserves of Indonesia, burdened by both
large long-term and short-term debt, should not be
limited to the capacity to meet import payments.
Equally important is to have the capacity to meet
short-term outflows from international liabilities and
broad money in anticipation of potential capital flight,
to avoid the effect of strong foreign currency market
fluctuations on the economy. Thus, the level of foreign
reserves should be enough to enable the country to
pay for its imports for at least three months, pay for
short-term obligations and also account for broad
money requirement and potential capital flight. Today,
however, the current international reserve position in
Indonesia is just sufficient to pay for imports and debt
servicing commitments for four months. Some key
international reserve indicators such as the
international reserve to external debt servicing ratio,
the international reserves to total foreign debt ratio
and international reserves to imports and government
debt payments plus interest, are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6 Developments in indicators of Indonesia’s external vulnerability (%)
Details 1996 1997 2002 2003 2004 2005
Current account to GDP ratio –3.4 –2.3 3.9 3.4 1.2 1.1
Export goods and services to GDP ratio 25.7 29.1 33.9 29.7 31.1 32.9
Non-oil export to GDP ratio 16.7 19.7 23.2 20.5 21.6 23.3
Payment of external debt interest to GDP ratio 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 1.7
Payment of external debt (principle and interest) 35.9 44.5 33.1 34.1 30.1 25.3
to export ratio
Capital account to GDP ratio 4.8 1.1 –0.6 –0.4 1.0 2.2
External debt to export goods and services ratio 188.7 207.3 193.9 190.8 174.3 142.9
External debt to GDP ratio 48.5 60.3 65.7 56.8 54.2 47.0
Reserves to external debt payment ratio 91.2 73.4 142.9 158.9 153.6 147.2
Reserves to external debt ratio 17.4 15.7 24.4 26.8 26.5 26.0
Reserves to import and government external debt 5.0 5.5 6.6 7.1 5.5 4.4
payment (months)
External debt (US$ billion) 110.2 136.1 131.3 135.4 137.0 133.5
Foreign reserve (US$ billion) 19.1 21.4 32.0 36.3 34.7 34.7
Source Annual Report Central Bank of Indonesia.
More broadly, the level of international reserves
Indonesia has had from 2001 to 2006 (September),
has been just enough to pay for the country’s import
requirements for six months. The international
reserves position in 2005 stood at US$34.7 billion,
while payment for three months’ imports required
US$17.4 billion, and debt servicing needed US$24.4
billion. Nonetheless, the level of international
reserves the country had fell far short of the total
external debt obligations in 2005.
The opportunity cost always influences the decision to hold
reserves, especially if the level of reserves is large. If the
domestic interest rate is higher than that in the USA, the
cost of holding international reserves increases. Thus, the
level of reserves should be the level at which the marginal
cost of holding reserves equals the marginal benefits
derived from doing so. Research suggests that higher
foreign reserves can help reduce sovereign spreads as well
as improve credit ratings, and hence narrow the cost of
holding it. Their main advantage is, of course, reducing the
risk of crises. So, the greater the value of reserves, the
lower the cost of borrowing, which should be weighed
against the cost associated with interest rates differential.
In some cases, the central bank may choose to mop
up liquidity that arises from reserve accumulation
through sterilisation. This is sometimes necessary if
the government has large sums of foreign exchange.
Nonetheless, the case of Indonesia, with its relatively
small reserve level, makes the issue of cost arising
from sterilisation not a crucial one.
5 Vulnerability
Macroeconomic stability is gradually showing signs of
returning to normality. Inflation, foreign exchange
availability, interest rates, international reserves,
budget deficit, the current account and the balance
of payments are all indicators that point to overall
improvement in Indonesian macroeconomic
conditions. Nonetheless, the large government debt,
the external debt, and the huge volume of short-
term inflows into the Indonesian economy are
factors that pose a potentially serious threat for
economic stability in the future.
Even today, the economy remains quite vulnerable.
Evidence of that were the nerves observed in the
economy in mid-2005, partially due to high fuel
prices, which hovered around US$70 per barrel on
the international market. Specifically, the oil price
hikes in mid-2005 had a destabilising effect on
Indonesia’s economy, as the government was left
with no alternative but to increase domestic fuel
prices by an average of 127 per cent. The hikes in
gasoline prices sparked off increases in other prices,
sending the inflation level to 17 per cent in 2005
(Figure 13). In August 2005, the rupiah experienced a
mini crisis (as the World Bank puts it), caused by loss
of market confidence in the monetary policy and
concerns over the impact of increasing oil price on
the state budget (Figure 12).
The rupiah was pushed up to nearly Rp11,000/US
dollar in August 2005, the lowest since 2002. The
crisis affected the international reserves position,
which decreased from US$35 billion in early 2005 to
US$28 billion in September 2005 (Figure 14). In
response to such developments, Bank Indonesia
adopted a tight monetary policy to avert a
recurrence of the 1998 crisis, taking measures such
as raising the interest rate on the Bank of Indonesia
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(BI) rate from 8.5 per cent in July 2005 to 12.75 per
cent in December 2005.
By 2006, the macroeconomic turmoil was under
control, allowing Bank Indonesia to resume its
gradual interest rate cuts on the BI rate, which
declined to 9.75 per cent by December 2006
(Figure 13). The inflow of short-term funds into
Indonesia was resumed, thereby helping increase the
level of international reserves once again. This has led
to the restoration of macroeconomic stability.
However, the rupiah faces vulnerability because its
strength depends heavily on short-term capital
inflows. Moreover, the impact of the mini crisis on
economic growth, poverty and unemployment will
take time to overcome.
6 Conclusion
The economic crisis, which rocked Indonesia in
mid-1997, has taught Indonesia some vitally
important lessons. The crisis that started as an
exchange rate crisis of the rupiah, became a fully-
fledged economic crisis. Indonesia, being a fairly
small open economy, is increasingly becoming
integrated into the global financial system, which
increases its vulnerability to fluctuations in foreign
markets.
The crisis made economic reforms imperative. The
economic reforms which began with the policy
package embodied in the IMF Letter of Intent (LoI) and
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies
(MEFP), hopefully laid a strong foundation for a sound
economy, even though initially they had some very
negative effects. The economic reforms encompassed
the macroeconomy, financial sector restructuring and
structural reforms. Consequently, many changes have
taken place in Indonesia’s economic institutions, taking
the form of laws, or formation of new institutions and
amendment of the Indonesia constitution. Financial
market reforms, especially in the banking sector, have
laid a strong foundation for a sound/healthy and
efficient banking industry. A similar trend is apparent
in the development of other financial institutions,
which have registered remarkable progress since the
crisis. However, the development of the non-financial
sectors, especially the productive ones, continues to be
slow, despite a number of policies implemented in
their support. The result has been the development of
the financial sector, which is not in consonance with
that achieved by the non-financial sector. The poor
performance of investment activities and, linked to
that, the productive activities, has aggravated the
situation. Doubtless, there is a wide gap between the
performance of the financial sector and non-financial
sector in Indonesia. The above drawback is
compounded by the increase in short-term capital
flows which, mainly lured by remarkable
developments in the domestic financial markets, pose
a potential threat to macroeconomic stability. The mini
crisis that affected Indonesia, just a year after the
country had graduated from the IMF programme, is a
strong reminder of the high vulnerability of the
Indonesian economy. 
Indonesia will face formidable obstacles in maintaining
macroeconomic stability in the future. The dilemma
Indonesia faces is that in order to attract short-term
capital flows, it must provide high returns, achievable
with a high interest rate regime; while the low
investment in the economy demands the adoption of
low interest rates. Thus, in the short term, the
government and the monetary authorities must find a
solution to reduce the over dependence of the
economy on short-term capital inflows, thereby
diminishing the vulnerability of the economy from
such an unstable and volatile type of capital. This is
particularly the case because the country has fairly low
foreign exchange reserves.
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Note
* This article was written with the help of Ahmad
Adi Nugroho, Ratih Pratiwi Anwar and R. Awang
Susatya Wijaya.
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